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The Risk of Reliance on Perceived Risk
Frank B. Cross*
During the 1970's, Chauncey Starr and others alerted society to the
inaccurate risk perceptions held by the general public. 1 As
documented in a variety of sources, the public's perceived risks from
activities such as electric power production corresponded very poorly
with "actual" or "objective" risks presented by these activities, as
actually measured or estimated from empirical data. The initial
commentaries tended to dismiss the perceived risks of the public as
uninformed opinions to be ignored or corrected by decision makers.
A response to this position has increasingly arisen to defend reliance
on perceived risk as opposed to what is often referred to as objective
risk. The critics have observed accurately that the public concept of
"risk" is complex and means more than a simple probabilistic estimate of
morbidity or mortality. These critics have performed a service by
making explicit the relevance of values in the assessment of risk. Some
critics have gone even farther, though, to suggest that the public
perceptions of risk are in some sense "better" than more scientifically
grounded probabilistic estimates and that public perceptions should
drive public policy decisions.
In fairness, these critics do not recommend the total exclusion of
scientific information from the public policy debate. They may argue,
however, that public perception should take some precedence over
probabilistic estimates. These authors have made such suggestions as
* Dr. Cross is Associate Professor of Business Regulation at the University of
Texas at Austin.
1 See, e.g., Starr, Introductory Remarks in SOCIETAL RISK ASSESSMENT:
HOW SAFE IS SAFE ENOUGH? 4 (R. Schwing and W. Albers eds. 1980). This work
is quoted briefly in Thompson, infra note 2, at 3.
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that "a reasonable person's concept of risk, vague as it is, is better
suited to the regulatory requirements of risk management than are
probabilistic concepts [of experts]." 2 Others have gone so far as to
suggest that expert "assessments of probabilities and magnitudes of
undesired outcomes.., are largely irrelevant to societal technology
choices."' 3 An increasing number of authors contend that the relative
perceived risks of the public should be more important than "actual"
risks in societal policy making.4
The defenders of reliance on public perceptions of risk generally do
not elaborate on precisely what role such perceptions should play in
government decision making, as opposed to probabilistic assessments
of risk employing the scientific method. Perhaps these authors do not
mean to be taken literally when they state that public perception is "best"
or "better suited" to regulation, but they leave the distinct impression
that popular perceptions should be more important than scientific
probabilistic estimates.
The attack on traditional probabilistic risk perspectives and the
defense of reliance upon risk perception is probably a natural
consequence of post-modernist thought, which questions the very
existence of such concepts as truth and objective reality. In this view,
reality is no more than perception. This approach found its first
prominent outlet in literature, where such leading deconstructionists as
Stanley Fish could reportedly proclaim that the theory "relieves me of
the obligation to be right... and demands only that I be interesting." 5
The defenders of public perception share similarities with
2 Thompson, Risk Objectivism and Risk Subjectivism: When Are Risks Real?,
1 RISK 3, 22 (1990).
3 Rayner & Cantor, How Fair is Safe Enough? The Cultural Approach to
Societal Technology Choice, 7 RISK ANALYSIS 3, 3 (1987).
4 See, e.g., Gillette & Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. PA. L. REV.
1027 (1990) (reviewing the support for this contention). The authors state: "Our
objective is not to show that the popular perspective is best, though we happen to
think it is." Id. at 1076.
5 D. LEHMAN, SIGNS OF THE TMES 75 (1991).
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deconstructionist defenders of the preeminence of a text's reader. The
post-modem critique soon evolved into the so-called hard sciences, with
claims like "the laws of physics are merely social conventions, like
traffic laws." 6
This post-modernist criticism need not be accepted, however. The
apparently progressive post-modernists may prove to have inescapable
roots in traditionalism, conservatism, and oppression. Before analyzing
the implications of risk perception and the post-modernist attack on the
search for objective truth, it is important to understand the nature and
implications of the disputed dialectic between truth and perception.
In a sense, the dichotomy between perceived and actual risk is a
false one. All relevant risk measures employ some human agency, so all
are literally perceived risks. There is no realistic means to eliminate
human perception and evaluation from the risk assessment process. The
dichotomy is still practically meaningful, however, and the key to the
debate is the basis for the varying perception. The real question is the
value of reliance on risks as perceived by the general public or on risks
as perceived by "experts" (who tend to assess risks based on data and
results produced by the scientific method). The real dispute is between
the relative legitimacy of the bases for the perceptions of the general
public and the bases for the scientific method. For simplicity, I will
distinguish these as "perceived risk" and "scientific method risk."
The defenders of reliance on perceived risk generally do not contend
that publicly perceptions of risk are more accurate (in the sense of being
predictive) than is scientific method risk measures. Some of these
authors engage merely in a philosophical analysis of what "risk" means.
They often stress the irrelevance of "accuracy" and emphasize that risk
can be seen as more than a scientific probability assessment and that
values properly enter into determinations of risk.7 These
6 Id. at 26.
7 See, e.g., Rayner & Cantor, supra note 3 (arguing that risk fairness is the key
consideration); Gillette & Krier, supra note 4, at 1085 (describing risk as containing
an "ethical-political question"); Linnerooth, The Political Processing of Uncertainty,
56 AcTA PSYCHOLOGICA 219,228-229 (1984) (arguing against "rationalist" model of
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commentaries generally assume without justifying, however, that the
values underlying perceived risk are superior or more legitimate than the
values underlying scientific method risk measures. I do not intend to
enter a metaphysical debate over what risk "is." Rather, I intend to
investigate the sociological implications of the differing constructs of
risk.
Reliance on subjective perceived risk, as contrast to scientific
method risk, is generally considered progressive and liberal. Advocates
of scientific method risk in environmental policy generally appear as
defenders of large polluting corporations, while defenders of perceived
risk appear as battlers for the "little guy," who mistrusts the large
corporate powers. While the actual progressiveness of the present
defenders of publicly perceived environmental risk against large
corporations is debatable, 8 it may be assumed for now. Even so, a
regime that relies predominantly upon perceived risk would have a
natural tendency toward illiberal societal consequences.
Perceived risk centrally differs from scientific method risk in that it
may more readily be manipulated. Consider an unusually hazardous
pesticide that causes one thousand deaths per year. The producers of the
pesticide may hire consultants, contribute to politicians, and take other
policy making).
8 There are several possible reasons why use of perceived risk could defeat societal
objectives that are generally considered progressive or liberal. First is the issue of
trade-offs. If reliance upon perceived risk causes the overregulation of, say, new
sources of air pollution and thereby indirectly causes the underregulation and
perpetuation of old sources of air pollution, the use of perceived risk could undermine
health protection among those who need it most. Second, overregulation carries
costs, which may cause the loss of employment opportunities. If the needy poor lose
such opportunities for employment, another liberal goal would be defeated. The
reliance on perceived risk may favor the natural environment over poor or
disadvantaged individuals, which is dubitably liberal.
Post-modernists reject all such teleological or utilitarian arguments, however.
They condemn "performativity," which is decision making based on the outcome of
policies or their pragmatic effect. These individuals reject performativity as placing
undue faith in reason, apparently without regard to any empirical test of whether such
faith is justified.
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measures to obscure the true risk of their product and maintain its
production. Ultimately, though, objective truth is on the side of the
regulators who can demonstrate the unsafeness of the pesticide. Of
course, such scientific truth does not always win out in our present
regulatory system, which can be slow and uncertain. The substantial
amount of strict environmental regulation that has been adopted does
demonstrate that powerful economic interests will often lose in a battle
against scientific data. If industry truly dominated regulatory estimates
of risk, it seems unlikely that government would have adopted rules
compelling tens of billions of dollars in annual compliance costs.9
In a regime of perceived risk, however, scientific data is not enough
that data must be presented to the relevant perceivers in a convincing
manner. The struggle becomes one over what advocacy group can best
affect public perception. Framing the struggle in this way gives an
enormous advantage to groups possessing economic and other sources
of social power and hurts disenfranchised groups. Powerful economic
interests cannot change objective truth, but they can change public
perception. Money and media are influential.
Liberal editorial cartoonist Mark Alan Stamaty has lampooned
reliance on public perceptions in decision making. His character, a
rather dull congressman named Bob Forehead, proclaimed to his
constituents: 10
Recently, there is evidence that lobbying by businessmen
and politicians succeeded in overruling a determination by
scientists that certain species should be listed as
"endangered." If Lobbying is now superior to science in
determining scientific fact, the day can't be far off when
public opinion polls will decide what is scientifically true.
And economically true as well. And one day in the near
future, a majority of Americans polled will agree that our
9 In 1990, pollution control activities in the U.S. will cost over $100 billion and
represent over 2% of our gross national product. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL INVESTMENTs: THE COST OF A CLEAN ENVIRONMENT, at v
(Dec. 1990).
10 Stamaty, Washington, Austin American-Statesman, Sept. 14, 1991, at A21.
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"deficits" won't exist. And they won't!
Next perhaps the homeless will be "perceived out of existence."
Although Statuaty presented this position as ridiculous, some defenders
of perceived risk come close to endorsing the Forehead position.
Reliance on perception is a prescription for entrenching powerful
groups and their interests. The powers-that-be have long recognized the
benefits of perception for combatting uncomfortable truths. Consider the
following historical examples: 11
For something not to exist, it is sufficient to declare that
it does not exist. The Guatemalan dictator Manuel Estrada
Cabrera decreed in 1902 that all of the country's volcanos
were calm, while an avalanche of lava and mire erupting
from the Santa Maria volcano razed more than a hundred
villages in the outskirts of Quezaltenango. In 1905, the
Colombian Congress approved a law establishing that
Indians did not exist in San Andres de Sotavento and other
territories where the streams of oil had suddenly sprung up;
the Indians who existed were made illegal, and the oil
companies were therefore able to kill them with impunity and
keep their lands.
Naziism surely thrived on convincing the German people of a
scientific lie of Aryan superiority, and Communism has its own history
of denying truth through modifying public perceptions.
Lest the above examples seem too extreme and foreign to be
threatening in the contemporary U.S., there are clear and present
circumstances where perceived risk leads to questionable ethical
decisions. For example, numerous successful New Yorkers with
children move to the suburbs in the interest of family safety. Yet
empirically grounded statistics indicate that among comparable
socioeconomic groups, the risk of death to children is much greater in
the suburbs than in Manhattan. 12 Perceived risk, though, says move to
Westchester County. One suspects that this perception is grounded in
11 Galeano, Language, Lies and Latin Democracy, Harper's, Feb. 1990, at 21.
12 See Hall, Parents Weigh Safety of New York vs. Suburbs, N.Y. Times, Sept.
5, 1991, at B1, B5 (national edition).
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fear of the many different ettinic groups found in the city.
In a far more distressing example, there is a widespread public
perception that young black males are exceptionally dangerous and
violence-prone. 13 Yet statistical data from the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and other sources indicates that young black males may be
no more violence-prone than other races and that the perception may be
due to bias in whom is arrested. 14 To proponents of risk perception,
however, this truth is not so important so long as blacks are perceived
as more dangerous, the government should deal with them accordingly.
Such an outcome is antithetical to liberality and human rights. A very
similar tale can be told with regard to the largely erroneous public
perception that the mentally ill are particularly dangerous to others. 15
Another example of the inequity of reliance on perceived risk is
provided by this nation's experience with Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome (AIDS). Objective science indicates that AIDS is not
transmissible through casual contact. 16 For a substantial portion of
society, however, there is a significant perceived risk from casual
contact with an AIDS sufferer. As a consequence, medical personnel
have denied services to AIDS victims, rescue personnel have denied
mouth-to-mouth resuscitation or even ambulance transportation, and
school authorities have refused education to AIDS-infected children. 17
Because AIDS is especially prevalent in the homosexual community, the
fear of AIDS has produced anti-gay discrimination and even
13 See Stark, The Myth of Black Violence, N.Y. Times, July 18, 1990, at A15
(national edition) ("Are blacks, particularly young black men, more prone to violence
than whites? The belief that they are is widely accepted by the public, media and
government.')
14 J&
15 See Shain & Phillips, The Stigma of Mental Illness: Labeling and
Stereotyping in the News, in RISKY BUSINESS: COMMUNICATING ISSUES OF
SCIENCE, RISK, AND PUBLIC POLICY 61 (L. Wilkins & P. Patterson eds. 1991).
16 See generally U.S. DEPT. HEALTH AND HUMAN SERvIcEs. SURGEON GENERAL'S
REPORTONACQuE IMMUEM DEFMI cNcy SYNDROME (1986).
17 See Survey on the Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Context of
Homosexual Activity, 40 U. MIAMI L. REv. 521, 630 (1986).
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violence. 18 AIDS provides a clear example of how risk perception is
employed to further victimize a community that already suffers
discrimination and how that community needs scientific method risk
measures to defend itself.
All of these cases illustrate a central value problem with risk
perception. Minorities, perceived deviants, and the unknown in general
all seem risky. Although the reality of these risks can be disproved
through the scientific method, the values of perceived risk nevertheless
proclaim the riskiness of blacks, or gays, or whatever minority group
seems threatening. Perceived risk is thus a potentially powerful tool of
an entrenched and xenophobic status quo against outsiders.
It is ironic that advocates of risk perception typically defend their
perspective as a counterweight to empowered elites who supposedly
control scientific risk assessment. One author, for example, contends
that "the issue is not risk, but power, the power to impose risks on the
many for the benefit of the few." 19 This perspective may have some
limited truth in some contexts of today's regulatory world, which is
predominantly based upon scientific method risk assessment. Yet it is
inordinately naive to believe that a shift toward perceived risk would
cause the elites to surrender their interests. It seems far more likely that
the empowered elites would redeploy their resources in order to
manipulate public perceptions of risk more effectively.
The powerful elites are particularly well positioned to manipulate
public perceptions. Almost by definition, these elites control or at least
influence the media and other tools capable of influencing the public. In
a world of objective science, the elites may attempt to deny the existence
of Indians in San Andres de Sotavento, but cannot change the fact of
their existence. In a world of pure perceptions, though, the elites may
attempt to deny the existence of Indians in San Andres de Sotavento
18 See Note, Characterization and Disease: Homosexuals and the Threat of AIDS,
66 N.C. L. REv. 226,237-238 (1987).
19 C. PERRow, NORMAL AccDENTs: LiviNG WrM HIGH RISK TscHNoLOkIFs 306
(1984).
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and, given the right public relations firm, may succeed. The scientific
method becomes an essential tool for the disenfranchised to fight abuses
of the empowered elites.
If the defenders of reliance on risk perception consider themselves
liberal, they should be worrying about the accompaniment of some very
strange bedfellows. Their companions include middle class whites who
fear minority crime, homophobes, religious fundamentalists, and
fascists, at least in foreign nations. While these instances are only
examples, they are substantial ones. In addition, the preceding liberal
critique of reliance on risk perception finds substantial support in both
history and social science.
The anthropologist Mary Douglas has written extensively on the
cultural constructs underlying risk perception. She observes a tendency
to seek moral, rather than scientific, bases for risk and to equate risk
with sin. Her categorization of an "individualist" culture, based on
individual risk perceptions (as opposed to those of a scientific hierarchy)
involves the inevitable stigmatization of minorities as "dangerous" or
sinful.2 0 Perceived risk becomes a tool in the suppression of societally
marginal minority groups. Charles Rosenberg has observed:2 1
Cultural values and social location have always provided
the materials for self-serving constructions of
epidemiological risk. The poor, the alien, the sinner have all
served as convenient objects for such stigmatizing
speculations.
Such marginal groups have little opportunity to alter risk perceptions
held by the broad public.22
20 Douglas, Risk as a Forensic Resource, Daedalus, Fall 1990, at 13-16.
21 Quoted in id. at 15.
22 It has been suggested that the defense of perceived risk uses the concept as a
proxy for the normative issue of consent to risk. Consent, or the voluntary
acceptance of risk, is surely a defensible standard, when used on an individual basis.
Use of perceived risk in government policy making, though, relies at best upon some
sort of majoritarian group consent that offers little protection of minority interests.
In addition, in this context, the argument from consent depends on an assumption
that the people want government regulation based on their group perceptions rather
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Political scientists also have found a liberalizing effect of science and
objective truth. Yaron Ezrahi has noted the important political function
of science in the modem liberal-democratic state.23 Science combats
the ability of empowered elites to command action based on arbitrary or
self-serving motives, by holding the elites accountable to an external
truth. The alternative to reliance on science is the dependence "upon
traditional, hierarchic, religious, and other nondemocratic
authorities." 24 Professor Ezrahi argues that the "[c]ommon acceptance
of formal rules is indeed the only alternative to direction by a single will
man has yet discovered."25
History especially confirms the dangers of indeterminism and
reliance on popular, rather than scientific truth. The witch trials of the
Inquisition and at Salem are but one prominent example. National public
acceptance of Nazi science and disastrous Lysenkoism further validate
the danger. When "the theatrical is free from constraints imposed in the
name of the 'factual' and the 'real,"' the result in this century has been
"the antidemocratic politics of totalitarian systems like fascism." 26
The dispute between scientific method and public perception traces
its roots to the Enlightenment. Although the Enlightenment's enormous
faith in science can be criticized, it nevertheless was "a great liberating
movement which in its day eliminated a great deal of cruelty,
superstition, injustice and obscurantism. '" 2 7 And it is important to
remember that the romantic resistance to the Enlightenment faith in
science was led by the proto-fascist Joseph de Maistre and the less-
threatening but undeniably conservative Edmund Burke. Isaiah Berlin
has written that the historic "abandonment of reason and all sense of
reality" in subjectivism has produced "often monstrous moral and
than scientific method, an assumption that is not yet proved.
23 y. EZRAHI, THE DESCENTOF ICARUS (1990).
24 Id. at 195.
25 Id. at 20, quoting Friedrich Hayek.
26 Id. at 282.
27 I. BERuN, THE CROOKED TMER OF HUMAmrY 34 (1990).
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political consequences" in totalitarian states.2 8 Hegel contrasted the
"genuine truth" of reason with the artificial truth that is "veiled behind
subjective ideas and feelings," and wrote that "[t]hose who.., are
assured that the whole truth is directly present in their unschooled
opinions, fail to apply themselves to the task of exalting their
subjectivity of truth and to knowledge of duty and objective right. The
only possible fruits of their attitude are folly, abomination, and the
demolition of the whole ethical order... "29 With respect to the post-
modem view that "there is no such thing as truth or objectivity, that
there are only points of view," a critic logically observed that when
"there is no difference between right and might, it is just as well to be on
the side of might."30 History and philosophy teach us the hazards of
reliance on general public perceptions of truth as a guide to action.
Perhaps the most persuasive defense of objective reality and the
scientific method can be found in the seemingly alien field of literature.
Few tales of oppression are more compelling than 1984, and George
Orwell's authoritarian Big Brother recognized the need to destroy the
concept that reality is something objective and testable. To dominate and
oppress, Big Brother propagated the perception that neither words nor
reality had real external meaning, declaiming that "reality exists in the
human mind, and nowhere else.' 3 1 Totalitarians find such minds far
more malleable than the authentic scientific method.
The above criticism of reliance on risk perception does not imply
that democratic governments should ignore public values and
perceptions of risk entirely. Such a contention would be hopelessly
naive in a democracy. Unquestioning deference to the conclusions of
scientists is also potentially counterproductive. History shows that
perceptions or opinions of government scientists, if not science itself,
can be controlled or manipulated by authoritarians much like the
28 Id. at 58.
29 See 46 GREAT BooKsOFTBEWESTERN WORLD 86 (R. Hutchins ed. 1952).
30 Todorov, Crimes Against Humanities, New Republic, July 3, 1989, at 28.
31 Id.
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perceptions of the public. Action should not be exclusively driven by
government scientists. The dangers of risk perception do caution that the
pursuit of truth through the scientific method should be the object of
governance. The people need noi be foreclosed from risk determination,
but reality (as ascertained through the scientific method) must remain as
a check on the powers of government to act on public perceptions.
Government systems should be constructed so as not to defer
automatically or even presumptively to public perceptions of risk,
unchecked by scientific data. While the public must remain the ultimate
authority in a democracy, capable of dismissing governments, public
perceptions need not directly direct all specific policy actions, as if the
U.S. were governed as ancient Athens.
Reliance upon the scientific method protects against the illiberalism
of perceived risk. As an external value, scientific truth cannot itself be
manipulated by oppressors. Kant assured readers that "reason is
sufficiently held in check by its own power, the limits imposed on it by
its own nature are sufficient."3 2 Indeed, the scientific method is a far
better check on the manipulations of scientists themselves than is public
perception. Lysenkoism might convince the Soviet public of its
erroneous precepts but could not withstand the scrutiny of outside
scientific investigation. The search for objective truth through the
scientific method offers a far sounder value foundation than does
government reliance on public perceptions of risk.
32 See supra note 29, at 221.
